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©Copyright 2005 NCAC
WEB DESIGN
Jeanne Criscola Criscola Design
free speech first amendment censorship
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Erznoznik,
manager of a drive-in theater, was charged with
violating a city ordinance prohibiting the showing
of films that contained nudity at drive-in theaters
where the screen could be viewed from a public
street or place. A separate hearing was held to
determine whether the ordinance was constitutionally
valid.
The Court ruled that the ordinance was invalid
on its face:
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First,
where the city had contended the ordinance
was justified because it protected its citizens
against unwilling exposure to offensive
material, the court found that since the
ordinance discriminated among movies solely
on the basis of nudity, but not all offensive
content, it could not be justified. Such
selective restrictions have been upheld
only when:
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the
speaker intrudes into the privacy of
the home, |
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or
the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor
to avoid exposure. |
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Second,
the ordinance could not be justified as
a method to protect minors. The city ordinance
was not limited to sexually explicit nudity
or limited in any other way. Rather, it
sweepingly forbade the display of all films
containing any nudity, regardless of context
or pervasiveness. Strict
scrutiny requires that a law restricting
otherwise protected speech be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest in
order to be valid under the First
Amendment. Therefore, the restriction
was overbroad. |
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Third,
the ordinance could not be justified as a
traffic ordinance because it was under-inclusive.
It did not include any aspect of a film other
than nudity that may distract a driver. |
In
summary, the Court noted that it will find an
ordinance facially invalid only (1) if it cannot
be interpreted in a narrow way; and (2) when its
deterrent effect on speech is real and substantial.
The city had not offered any narrow interpretation
or justification, and the ordinance had had a
widespread effect on what all drive-in movie owners
and managers could exhibit. Thus, the required
conditions were not met and the court concluded
that the ordinance was facially invalid. |
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| These
materials are not intended, and should not be used, as
legal advice. They necessarily contain generalizations
that are not applicable in all jurisdictions or circumstances.
Moreover, court decisions may be superceded by subsequent
rulings, and may be subject to alternative interpretations.
Corrections, clarification, and additions are welcome.
Please send to ncac@ncac.org. |
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