in support of free expression
The information presented here by the National
Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC) may be freely redistributed in its entirety,
provided that readers are informed that the information was obtained from
NCAC's World Wide Web site and that credit is given to the appropriate source
of whatever information is used. Permission is expressly granted for the information
obtained to be made available for file transfer from installations offering
unrestricted anonymous file transfer on the Internet. Information found here
may not be sold for profit or incorporated in commercial documents without
the written permission from the National Coalition Against Censorship.
©Copyright 2005 NCAC
WEB DESIGN
Jeanne Criscola Criscola Design
free speech first amendment censorship
|
|
|
|
|
The
“Beirut Agreement” was a treaty designed
to promote the circulation of “educational,
scientific, and cultural” audio-visual works.
Works falling within the treaty’s scope received
various benefits, including exemption from import
duties. The United States Information Agency (USIA)
was responsible for certifying films that qualified
under the treaty. The plaintiffs here were filmmakers,
production, and distribution companies whose films
were denied certification. The plaintiffs alleged
that the regulations used by the USIA to determine
whether a work qualified under the treaty were unconstitutional.
Generally, the two contested regulations prohibited
certification of materials which discredited or
advocated any political, religious, or economic
views; sought to influence opinion or policy; or
lent themselves to misinterpretation or misrepresentation.
In assessing whether the regulations interfered
with freedom of speech, the Court had three central
findings. First, the Court held that the regulations
drew distinctions on the basis of content, and also
possibly on the basis of viewpoint. The Court further
concluded the USIA’s proscription on films
limited expressions of opinion on issues of public
controversy. Finally, the Court held the regulations
conditioned the conferral of a benefit on the relinquishment
of a constitutional right.
For these three reasons, the Court concluded that
the USIA regulations were therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. To justify its regulations the USIA
therefore had to show the regulations were “necessary
to serve a compelling state interest” and
“narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”
The Court rejected the USIA’s argument that
the proscription was justified by foreign policy
concerns and concluded the regulations violated
the First
Amendment.
The Court also held the regulations were void for
vagueness.
The Court applied a strict vagueness analysis due
to the high First Amendment stakes, fearful that
uncertain meanings would lead citizens to steer
too widely outside of the unlawful zone. Here the
Court held the regulations were so ambiguous that
they provided USIA officials with a virtual license
to engage in censorship. |
|
Significance: |
| This
case is significant for the Court’s decision
to find the regulations unconstitutional, which
entailed not deferring to Congress and/or the President
on foreign affairs and trade issues, which is often
the case. |
|
| These
materials are not intended, and should not be used, as
legal advice. They necessarily contain generalizations
that are not applicable in all jurisdictions or circumstances.
Moreover, court decisions may be superceded by subsequent
rulings, and may be subject to alternative interpretations.
Corrections, clarification, and additions are welcome.
Please send to ncac@ncac.org. |
|
Action Alerts
» National
» Eastern
» Central
» Mountain
» Pacific
» email alert sign-up
» report censorship!
|
