BULLFROG
FILMS INC. v. WICK, 847
F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988)
BULLFROG
FILMS, INC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. CHARLES Z. WICK,
DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
No.
86-6630.
United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued
and Submitted July 10, 1987.
Decided
May 17, 1988.
Wendy M.
Keats, Appellate Staff Atty., U.S. Dept. of
Justice (Civil
Div.), Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.
David Cole,
Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City,
Ben Margolis,
Margolis, McTernan, Scope & Epstein, Los
Angeles, Cal.,
for plaintiffs-appellees.
Robert B.
Broadbelt, ACLU Foundation of Southern California,
Los Angeles,
Cal., for amici.
Appeal from
the United States District Court for the Central
District of
California.
Before BROWNING,
FLETCHER and POOLE, Circuit Judges.
POOLE, Circuit
Judge:
[1] This appeal
is brought by the United States Information
Agency (USIA),
as the federal agency charged with the domestic
administration
of the Beirut Agreement, a multilateral treaty
aimed at facilitating
the international circulation of "educational,
scientific and cultural" audio-visual materials.
Under the
treaty, qualifying materials receive various
benefits, including
exemption from import duties. A certificate
of international
educational character is a necessary prerequisite
to the receipt
of treaty benefits.
Owners of American materials must apply to the
USIA for such certificates.
Plaintiffs-appellees are film makers, production
and distribution
companies and a membership association, all
of whom have an
interest in one or more films that were denied
certification. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the regulations
employed by
the USIA to implement the treaty were unconstitutional.
On a motion
for summary judgment, the district court agreed,
holding that
three of the regulations are facially unconstitutional,
in violation
of the First and Fifth Amendments.
[2] For reasons
set forth below, we affirm.
I.
A.
[3] The Beirut
Agreement,
the outgrowth of a proposal by the United
States delegation to the General Conference
of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) at
its third session in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1948,
entered into
force on August 12, 1954. S.Rep. No. 1626, 89th
Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted
in
1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News
3143, 3143-44 (S.Rep. No. 1626). The United
States Senate ratified
the Agreement on May 26, 1960, but deposit of
ratification
was withheld pending the enactment of implementing
legislation.
Id.
On October 8, 1966, Congress passed the
necessary
implementation statute, Pub.L. No. 89-634; 80
Stat. 879 (1966),
and formal operations by the United States under
the Agreement
commenced January 12, 1967. 22 C.F.R. §
502.1.
[4] According
to its Preamble, the purpose of the Agreement
is to facilitate
the international circulation of audio-visual
materials
that are of an "educational, scientific and
cultural character."
This objective is portrayed as part of a larger
effort to
promote the "free flow of ideas by word and
image" and encourage
"the mutual understanding of peoples."
[5] To achieve
these ends, contracting States agree to accord
certain benefits
to qualifying materials. These benefits include
exemption
from customs duties, import licenses, special
rates, quantitative
restrictions and other restraints and costs.
Art. III,
1, 3. The value of these benefits to those seeking
to export
audio-visual materials can be substantial.
[6] Securing
favorable treatment under the Agreement is a
two-step process.
First, the exporter must obtain a certificate
from the appropriate
governmental agency in the country of the material's
origin attesting
to the item's educational, scientific or
cultural character.
Art. IV, 1-2. Second, the certificate must
be filed with
the appropriate governmental agency of the
contracting
State into which entry is sought. That agency
must then
decide for itself whether the material presented
qualifies for
benefits under the Agreement. Art. IV, 4. The
decision of the
importing state is final. Art. IV, 6.
[7] Article
I of the Agreement offers the following broad
standards for
judging whether materials qualify as educational,
scientific or
cultural:
Visual and
auditory materials shall be deemed to be
of an educational,
scientific and cultural character:
(a) when
their primary purpose or effect is to
instruct
or inform through the development of a
subject or
aspect of a subject, or when their
content is such as to maintain, increase or
diffuse knowledge,
and augment international
understanding and goodwill; and
(b) when
the materials are representative, authentic,
and accurate;
and
(c) when
the technical quality is such that it does
not interfere
with the use made of the material.
[8] When Congress,
in 1966, enacted implementing legislation, it
authorized
the President to designate a federal agency
to "take appropriate
measures for the carrying out of the provisions
of the
Agreement including the issuance of regulations."
Pub.L. No. 89-634;
80 Stat. 879. Pursuant to this Congressional
delegation, the
USIA, the selected agency, issued regulations
to facilitate the
implementation of the Agreement. World-Wide
Free Flow (Export-Import)
of Audio-Visual Materials,
22 C.F.R. §§ 502.1-502.8.
Under these regulations, applications for
certificates
of international educational character are reviewed
by the Agency's
Chief Attestation Officer or his subordinates.
If certification
is denied, the regulations provide for appeal
to a Review
Board, and, as a last resort, to the director
of the USIA. 22
C.F.R. § 502.5(b)-(c).
[9] In addition
to setting application procedures, the USIA's
implementing
regulations establish "substantive criteria"
for determining
eligibility for certification. 22 C.F.R. §
502.6. Three
of these regulations were held by the district
court to be unconstitutional
on their face and are at issue in this appeal.
The first
regulation repeats verbatim the definition of
"educational,
scientific or cultural" found in Article I of
the Agreement.
22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3). The other two
regulations were
promulgated by the USIA to assist in the "interpretation"
of the
Article I criteria. Section 502.6(b)(3) provides:
The Agency
does not certify or authenticate materials
which by
special pleading attempt generally to
influence
opinion, conviction or policy (religious,
economic,
or political propaganda), to espouse a
cause, or
conversely, when they seem to attack a
particular
persuasion. . . .
[10] Section
502.6(b)(5) reads as follows:
The Agency
does not regard as augmenting
international understanding or good will and
cannot
certify or authenticate any material which may
lend
itself to misinterpretation, or misrepresentation
of
the United States or other countries, their
peoples
or institutions, or which appear to have as
their
purpose or effect to attack or discredit economic,
religious,
or political views or practices.
B.
[11] Plaintiffs-appellees
are independent film makers, film production
and distribution companies and a membership
association.
They brought suit in the district court to challenge
the constitutionality
of two of the USIA regulations referred to
in the previous
section, 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.6(b)(3)
and (b)(5), after
the USIA refused to certify seven of their films
as "educational,
scientific, or cultural" under the Agreement.
[12] The films
denied certification cover a wide range of Topics
and are
described briefly by appellees as follows: (1)
In
Our Own Backyards:
Uranium Mining in the United States
looks at "the effects
of uranium mining on the environment and on
the health of those
who work in or live near the mines"; (2) Save
the Planet presents
"a film history of the atomic age"; (3) Ecocide:
A Strategy
of War
"documents the environmental impact of United
States military
tactics in Vietnam"; (4) From
the Ashes . . . Nicaragua
Today
"traces the historical roots of the 1979
Nicaraguan
Revolution"; (5) Whatever
Happened to Childhood? "addresses
the changing reality facing children growing
up in modern-day
urban America, principally through first-hand
interviews
and statistical evidence"; (6) Peace:
A Conscious Choice
"attempts to teach its viewers about the first
step toward
peace in a Cold War society, by suggesting that
the United States
and the Soviet Union are inextricably related,
and that their
relationship has implications for world peace";
(7) The
Secret
Agent
"examines the use and effects of dioxin, a toxic
ingredient
in Agent Orange, through archival footage and
interviews."
Aples.' Br. at 6-11. Many of these films are
the recipients
of prizes, awards and other forms of critical
acclaim.
[13] The district
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment,
finding both §§ 502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5)
facially violative
of the First and Fifth Amendments. Bullfrog
Films, Inc.
v. Wick,
646 F. Supp. 492,
510 (C.D.Cal. 1986). The court, sua
sponte,
also granted summary judgment to plaintiffs
with respect
to the facial invalidity of § 502.6(a)(3).
Id.
It went
on to permanently enjoin the USIA from enforcing
the three regulations
and ordered the Agency to reconsider the eligibility
of plaintiffs'
films under constitutionally sound standards.
Id.
at 510-11.
[14] The USIA
now appeals.
II.
[15] Our initial
concern is with the USIA's argument that
plaintiffs-appellees
lack standing to challenge the Agency's
regulations.
Rejecting the conclusions of the district court,
the USIA
contends that plaintiffs have failed to meet
the requirements
for Article III standing set forth in Valley
Forge Christian
College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and
State,
454 U.S. 464,
472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700
(1982).
We disagree.
A.
[16] The requirement
that a plaintiff present an injury in fact is
satisfied
by the showing of a pecuniary injury. Data
Processing v.
Camp,
397 U.S. 150,
154, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184
(1970). By
alleging they have had to pay customs duties
to export to
Canada four of their films, plaintiffs discharge
this burden.
Plaintiffs also satisfy this requirement by
alleging that
the denial of benefits under the Agreement puts
their films at
a competitive disadvantage in the international
marketplace, resulting
in the loss of sales. See
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58,
64 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 631, 636 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d
584 (1963). Although plaintiffs did not produce
evidence that
the payment of customs duties or other barriers
caused decreased
sales or profits, at the summary judgment stage,
a plaintiff's
allegations need not be proven but merely provable.
United
States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669,
689, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2416, 37
L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973).
[17] We also
find merit in plaintiffs' contention that the
denial of USIA
certification works a cognizable injury to their
ability to compete
for benefits under the Agreement. Such competitive
injuries have
often been recognized as grounds for standing.
Regents
of University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265,
280-81 n.
14, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2743 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 750
(1978) (university
decision not to permit plaintiff to compete
for all 100
places in entering medical school class); Preston
v. Heckler,
734 F.2d 1359,
1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure of government
agency to adopt standards that would enable
plaintiff to
be considered for employment); Glacier
Park Foundation v. Watt,
663 F.2d 882,
885 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal agency's
statutory
violations rendered plaintiff "unable to compete
on an equal
basis" for concession contract). Cf.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,
261-63, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561-63,
50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (refusal of city to rezone
precluded
possibility of construction of low income-housing).
Here, it is
undisputed that a certificate of international
educational
character is, as the district court found, an
"indispensable
prerequisite" to the realization of benefits
under the
Agreement. 646 F. Supp. at 501; see
Treaty, Art. IV, ¶ 1. The
USIA acknowledged as much when in its briefs
below it stated that
USIA certificates are the "sine
qua non
for receipt of customs
exemptions." 646 F. Supp. at 502. We therefore
find that plaintiffs
have sustained a competitive injury because
by denying certification
the USIA has deprived them of the opportunity
to obtain
favorable treatment under the Agreement.
B.
[18] The USIA
takes the position that even if the injury in
fact requirement
is met, none of the alleged injuries is likely
to be redressed
by a favorable judgment because importing states
will necessarily
reject plaintiffs' films. We reject this contention.
First, we
are not persuaded that all Beirut Agreement
signatories employ
precisely the same implementing regulations,
i.e.
the regulations
promulgated by the USIA. So far as we can discern,
with the exception
of Canada, none of the approximately sixty
other Beirut
Agreement participants, see
22 C.F.R. § 502.7(e), has
promulgated any formal regulations to implement
the Treaty whatsoever.
Nevertheless, appellants ask us to conclude
that the absence
of any contrary regulations establishes the
de
facto adoption
of the USIA's regulations by the other countries.
We do not
find support in fact for that conclusion.
Second, even if
it could be established that all other signatory
nations had adopted
the USIA's regulations, appellants would still
have the burden
of showing that the regulations are uniformly
applied. Otherwise,
it could not be said that certification of plaintiffs'
materials
would certainly lead to their rejection by any
and all importing
nations. The inherent ambiguity and subjectivity
of the regulations
makes in our judgment such a double coincidence
far less
than a sure bet. Moreover, the fact that the
USIA has in the past
rejected films certified by Canada serves as
proof that authorities
in two countries with the same regulations do
not always
concur. See
Aples.' Br. at 17 n. 11.
[19] At present,
there is no disagreement among the parties that
USIA certificates
are accepted by importing states as a matter
of course.
We see no reason why this practice would change
dramatically
if the USIA certified films such as plaintiffs.
Accordingly,
we conclude that there is a substantial likelihood
that plaintiffs'
pecuniary injuries are "likely to be redressed
by the requested
relief." Allen
v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737,
751, 104
S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed. 2d 556 (1984).
[20] Redress
seems even more certain for the injury plaintiffs
allege to
their ability to compete for Beirut Agreement
benefits. If
plaintiffs' films are certified by the USIA,
they at least stand
a chance of winning foreign
acceptance. Without a certificate,
they have no possibility of even being considered
by other
countries for duty and licensing exemptions.
Opening the door
to the possibility of obtaining sought after
benefits is sufficient
to satisfy the redress requirement. Bakke,
438 U.S. at
280 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. at 2743 n. 14; Preston,
734 F.2d at 1366;
West
Virginia Assn. of Community Health Centers v.
Heckler,
734 F.2d 1570,
1576 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
III.
[21] In the
interests of judicial economy, the court should
decide this
case on non-constitutional grounds, if possible.
Thus, we first
consider appellees' contention that the two
interpretive regulations,
§§ 502.6(b)(3) and (5), offend the
Agreement, and are
therefore invalid.
[22] In order
for regulations to be valid, they must be consistent
with the legislation
under which they are promulgated. United
States
v. Larionoff,
431 U.S. 864,
873, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2156, 53 L.Ed.2d
48 (1977); Manhattan
General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner,
297 U.S. 129,
56 S.Ct. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936). If
they are not, they are void as contrary to law.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
Pacific
Coast Medical Enterprises v. Harris,
633 F.2d 123,
131 (9th Cir. 1980).
[23] The USIA
regulations were enacted pursuant to Pub.L.
No. 89-634.
This implementing legislation was obviously
intended to give
the USIA broad discretion by authorizing it
"to take appropriate
measures for carrying out the provisions of
the Agreement
including the issuance of regulations." The
legislative history
adds nothing to limit the scope of the USIA's
discretion. See
S.Rep. No. 1629. Thus, whether the USIA has
acted in conformity
with Pub.L. No. 89-634 turns on the language
of the Treaty
itself.
[24] Appellees
maintain that the Treaty's broad definition
of "educational,
scientific and cultural" excludes interpretations
which narrow
its scope. They contend that even if their films
do attempt
to influence opinion, espouse a cause or attack
a political
view or persuasion, in violation of 22 C.F.R.
502.6(b)(3)
and (5), they remain within the Treaty's definition
of educational
because they nevertheless serve to instruct,
inform and
increase knowledge. Any materials which satisfy
the Article
I definition, appellees emphasize, "shall" be
deemed educational
in character. Appellees therefore insist that
the regulations
are invalid because they deny certification
to materials
that, under a broad reading of the Treaty definition,
presumably
qualify as educational. The district court rejected
appellees'
contention. It held that "the Treaty's language
is so broad
that it provides no standards against which
the Court can judge
the Agency's regulations." 646 F. Supp. at 500-01.
[25] While
we hesitate to say that the Treaty provides
"no standards",
we do agree that the language is extremely broad
and susceptible
to multiple interpretations. While the USIA
regulations
do not provide the widest possible definition
of what is
educational, scientific or cultural, they are
not so restrictive
that we may find them inconsistent with Pub.L.
89-634's broad
mandate. The fact that the Canadian regulations
are similar
to those challenged here, and that UNESCO referred
to them
without criticism, underscores our conclusion.
Unable to resolve
this case on statutory grounds, we proceed to
the constitutional
issues.
IV.
A.
[26] Before
we can determine whether the regulations are
constitutional,
we must first ascertain the appropriate level
of scrutiny.
We are guided in our inquiry by the understanding
that "[g]enerally,
statutory classifications are valid if they
bear a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Statutes are
subjected to a higher level of scrutiny if they
interfere with
the exercise of a fundamental right, such as
freedom of speech.
. . ." Regan
v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540,
547, 103 S.Ct.
1997, 2001, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983). Our
initial concern,
therefore, is whether the regulations impinge
on the
exercise of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
[27] Appellants
argue that the regulations do not implicate
the First
Amendment because they do not punish or directly
obstruct plaintiffs'
ability to produce or disseminate their films.
We disagree
both with appellants' benign characterization
of the effect
of their regulations and with their limited
reading of the requirements
of the First Amendment.
[28] As they
did below, appellants seek to characterize this
as a case
of the government simply declining to pay a
subsidy, as in Regan
v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540,
103 S.Ct. 1997,
76 L.Ed. 2d 129 (1983), where the Court held
that the government
may withhold a tax subsidy from nonprofit public
interest organizations
if they engage in political lobbying. The
challenged
statute and regulations in Regan
distinguished lobbying
from informational and charitable activities,
and reflected
Congress' choice under the spending power to
refuse to
use Treasury
funds to subsidize the lobbying activity. In
upholding
this distinction, the Court relied on the fact
that the lobbying
restriction was neutral as to content and not
aimed at the
suppression of particular ideas. Id.
at 548, 103 S.Ct. at 2002.
Our case is fundamentally different. Here, the
challenged
regulations discriminate based on content within
given media
of expression. Moreover, here, no Treasury Department
funds are
involved. As the district court observed, if
any "subsidy" is to
be paid at all, it "would come from the treasuries
of the foreign
states that agree to waive their customs duties."
646 F.
Supp. at 501. See
also
Christ, The
Beirut Agreement: A License
to Censor?,
7 Loy.L.A.Int'l & Comp.L.J. 255, 268-69
& n. 97
(1985).
[29] Nor do
we find Harris
v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297,
316, 100 S.Ct. 2671,
2687, 65 L.Ed. 2d 784 (1980), holding that a
state need not subsidize
abortions although it subsidies other medical
procedures,
including childbirth, to be controlling authority.
The Court,
in Harris
reasoned that "although government may not
place obstacles
in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom
of choice,
it need not remove those not of its own creation."
448 U.S.
at 316, 100 S.Ct. 2688. See
also Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464,
474, 97 S.Ct.
2376, 2382, 53 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1977). Here, by
contrast,
the government's denial of certification constitutes
an absolute
barrier to benefits under the treaty.
[30] Appellants
argue that the regulations do not "interfere"
with plaintiffs'
freedom of speech because they do not draw
distinctions
on the basis of the speaker's point of view.
Whether the
regulations are indeed "viewpoint neutral",
as appellants assert,
is doubtful.
However, the Supreme Court had
made it clear that legislation "does not evade
the strictures of the
First Amendment merely because it does not burden
the expression of
particular views.
. . ." Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1728, 95 L.Ed.2d
209 (1987).
Even if the regulations could be deemed neutral
with respect
to their burden on viewpoint, they may still
be found to "interfere"
with the exercise of plaintiffs' free speech
interests
if they improperly discriminate between exercises
of protected
speech on the basis of content. See
FCC v. League of Women
Voters,
468 U.S. 364,
383-84, 104 S.Ct. 3106, (1984); Metromedia,
Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490,
518-19, 101 S.Ct. 2882,
2898, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 530,
537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980);
Carey
v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455,
462 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2291 n. 6,
65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Police
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95, 92
S.Ct. 2286, 2289, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
[31] The challenged
regulations require that in order to be
certified,
a film must be balanced and truthful; must neither
criticize
nor advocate any political, religious, or economic
views; and
must not "by special pleading" seek to influence
opinion or
policy. Each of these requirements draws content-based
lines forbidden
by the First Amendment.
[32] The danger
inherent in government editorial oversight,
even in the
interest of "balance," is well established.
In Miami
Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241,
94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d
730 (1974), a unanimous Court struck down a
Florida statute
which required newspapers in the state to present
balanced campaign
coverage by publishing candidates' replies to
editorial
criticism of the candidate. According to the
Court, "[i]t
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of [the
editorial] process can be exercised consistent
with the First
Amendment." Id.
at 258, 94 S.Ct. at 2840. The USIA has
gone so far
as to deny certificates not only because certain
views were
assertedly missing, but also because viewpoints
mentioned
were, in the government's editorial judgment,
insufficiently
highlighted. However, the First Amendment does
not allow
the government to require independent filmmakers
to present all
views on a subject, or indeed any view contrary
to the filmmakers'
own. See
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,
631 F.2d 1030
n. 18 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
[33] The USIA's
proscriptions on films that "attempt generally
to influence
opinion" or to espouse or criticize a cause
or policy are
also unconstitutional, because they limit expressions
of opinion
on issues of public controversy. See
Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530,
100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d
319 (1980) (striking down order forbidding public
utilities
from using bill inserts to discuss "controversial
issues of
public policy"); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (striking
down prohibition
on editorializing by public broadcasting companies).
Regulations
based on the political or controversial subject
matter of
speech are particularly invidious, for they
restrict public
debate in that area most privileged by the First
Amendment.
League
of Women Voters,
468 U.S. at 381, 104 S.Ct. at
3118; NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886,
913, 102
S.Ct. 3409, 3425, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) ("expression
on public
issues `has always rested on the highest rung
of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values.'") Cf.
Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Moseley,
408 U.S. 92,
96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d
212 (1972) ("government may not grant the use
of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial
views.").
[34] In sum,
we find that the regulations plainly interfere
with the exercise
of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. First,
they disadvantage
materials on the basis of content. Non-certified
materials
are entirely ineligible to receive benefits
under the Agreement,
including the waiver of import duties. Such
content-based
distinctions are patently offensive to the First
Amendment.
See
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
___ U.S.
___, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1726-28, 95 L.Ed.2d 209
(1987). Second, by
conditioning a valuable governmental benefit
on the basis of speech
content, the USIA forces film makers to choose
between exercising
their right to free speech and foregoing benefits
under the
Agreement, or curtailing their speech and obtaining
the benefits.
The imposition of this sort of dilemma patently
transgresses
the well-established principle that government
may not
condition the conferral of a benefit on the
relinquishment of a
constitutional right:
For at least
a quarter-century, this Court has made
clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a
valuable
governmental benefit. . . . [i]t may not
deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally
protected interests — especially
his interest
in freedom of speech.
[35] Perry
v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593,
597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d
570 (1972). See
also Thomas v. Review Board,
450 U.S. 707,
101 S.Ct.
1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976); Shapiro
v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618,
89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969);
Sherbert
v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398,
83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963);
Speiser
v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513,
78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d
1460 (1958). For these reasons we conclude that
the regulations
infringe the First Amendment and warrant the
imposition
of strict scrutiny.
B.
[36] As a
result of our determination that appellants'
content-based regulations
infringe the First Amendment, appellants' burden
in attempting
to uphold its regulations is heavy. In order
to justify
its scheme for awarding Beirut Agreement certificates,
appellants
must demonstrate that their regulations are
"necessary
to serve a
compelling state interest" and are "narrowly
drawn to achieve
that end." Arkansas
Writers' Project,
107 S.Ct. at 1728;
Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37,
45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).
[37] Relying
on its earlier argument that the "rational relation"
standard of
review applies, the USIA makes no effort to
discharge this
higher standard. Instead, the government argues
that a deferential
level of scrutiny is appropriate because USIA
certification
decisions implicate "the delicate area of foreign
relations."
Appellant's Br. at 32. We agree with the district
court in rejecting
the suggestion that the First Amendment's
protection
is lessened when the expression is directed
abroad. 646
F. Supp. 503-04.
[38] The cases
cited by the government do not support its contention
that otherwise
protected free speech interests may be routinely
subordinated
to foreign policy concerns. In these cases,
the Supreme
Court either found the speech to be unprotected,
see
Haig
v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280,
284-85 & n. 7, 308-09, 101 S.Ct.
2766, 2770
& n. 7, 2782-83, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (disclosures
damaging to
intelligence operations and threatening to lives
of American
personnel are not protected by First Amendment),
or else found
that no content-based restrictions on speech
were involved in
government-imposed travel restrictions. See
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,
241-42, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3037, 82 L.Ed.2d 171
(1984) (upholding
content-and viewpoint-neutral restrictions on
travel to
Cuba); Zemel
v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1,
13, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1279, 14
L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (same). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recently
held that the government's interest in obeying
its
international
law obligation to safeguard the "dignity" of
foreign embassies
and diplomats was not "automatically" to be
regarded as
"`compelling' for purposes of First Amendment
analysis."
Boos
v. Barry,
___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1165, 99
L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (striking down content-based
restriction on display
of placards critical of foreign governments
outside those governments'
embassies). As the district court aptly stated:
it is clear
that there is no "sliding scale" of First
Amendment
protection under which the degree of
scrutiny
fluctuates in accordance with the degree to
which the
regulation touches on foreign affairs.
Rather, the
only permissible non-neutral inquiry into
the content
of the speech is whether the statements
adversely
affect foreign policy interests to such a
degree that
the speech is completely unprotected. As
Haig
v. Agee
itself indicates, the clearest example
of the kind
of compelling government interest that
would lead
to such a result is where the speech poses
a clear and
direct threat to national security. [39]
646 F. Supp. at 504.
[40] We do
not perceive the existence of a compelling state
interest,
and the government advances none. Certainly
the existence
of a Treaty does not by itself justify content-based
discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment. See
Boos v.
Barry,
108 S.Ct. at 1165; see
also Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1,
16-19, 77
S.Ct. 1222, 1230-31, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957).
Moreover, we
are not presented here with the sort of delicate
foreign policy
matter best entrusted to the political branches.
Cf.
Regan
v.
Wald,
468 U.S. at 242, 104 S.Ct. at 3037 (upholding
restrictions
on travel to Cuba). Nor do we find that the
regulations
are narrowly drawn. Accordingly, we agree with
the district
court that the challenged regulations violate
the First Amendment.
V.
[41] Due process
requires that insufficiently clear regulations
be held
void for vagueness. Grayned
v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104,
108, 92 S.Ct.
2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Laws that
are vague
are objectionable on a number of grounds. First,
they may
"trap the innocent by not providing fair warning."
Id.
Second,"[a]
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad
hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary
and discriminatory application." Id.
at 108-109, 92 S.Ct.
at 2298-99. Third, a vague statute that implicates
First Amendment
freedoms discourages the exercise of those freedoms:
"Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to `"steer
far wider
of the unlawful
zone" . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden
areas were clearly marked.'" Id.
at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299.
[42] Not surprisingly,
where the guarantees of the First Amendment
are at stake
the Court applies its vagueness analysis strictly.
In invalidating
a New York State teacher loyalty law on grounds
of unconstitutional
vagueness, the Court stated:
We emphasize
once again that "[p]recision of
regulation must be the touch-stone in an area
so
closely touching our most precious freedoms,"
N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button,
371 U.S. 415,
438 [83 S.Ct.
328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405]; "[f]or standards of
permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the
area of free
expression . . . . Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government
may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity."
Id.,
at 432-433 [83 S.Ct. at
337-338].
[43] Keyishian
v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589,
603-04, 87 S.Ct. 675,
684, 17 L.Ed.2d 629] (1967).
[44] In this
case, the district court decided that §§
502.6(b)(3) and
(5) were "unquestionably . . . unconstitutionally
vague," adding:
"these regulations are not merely `flexible';
they are boundless."
646 F. Supp. at 505. The district court drew
the same conclusion
with respect to § 502.6(a)(3). Id.
at 507.
[45] Appellants
contend first that because the certificates
are simply
an expression of governmental opinion, and do
not confer or
deny any benefits or interfere with any activity,
the certification
process does not implicate constitutional
considerations,
including the right to due process. This
contention
clearly fails for reasons stated in the preceding
section of
this opinion.
[46] Second,
appellants argue that a greater degree of vagueness
is tolerated
with respect to civil enactments, as opposed
to criminal,
"because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively
less severe." Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,
498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362
(1982). While
this may be true generally, it is not the case
where constitutional
rights are at issue. See
Keyishian, supra.
In fact
the Court in Hoffman
Estates
makes this very point:
perhaps the
most important factor affecting the
clarity that the Constitution demands of a law
is
whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise
of
constitutionally protected rights. If,
for example,
the
law interferes with the right of free speech
or
of
association, a more stringent vagueness test
should
apply.
[47] 455 U.S.
at 499, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 (emphasis added).
[48] Appellants
further contend that the regulations survive
the vagueness
challenge because "they are set out in terms
that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common-sense can
sufficiently understand
and comply with." Aplts.' Br. at 36, quoting
United States
Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers,
413 U.S. 548,
578-79, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d
796 (1973).
The validity of appellants, assertion is called
into serious
doubt by an examination of the language of the
regulations
themselves. Under 502.6(b)(3) the Agenc |